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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950835-CA 
v. : 
CHRISTIAN H. MAYFIELD, : Priority ,No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JPRISPICTION ANP NATPBB OF PRQCSEPINSS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a 
motion to suppress in a case in which defendant was charged 
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony and a Class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(1996), in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Box 
Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to review this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the 
initial stop of the car defendant was operating was 
justified? "In absence of clear error, the trial court's 
findings of fact underlying its decision to grant or deny 
the suppression motion must be upheld." Provo City v. 
Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992)(citations 
omitted), aff'd. 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), "However, as for 
the trial court's legal conclusions in regards thereto, the 
correction of error standard applies." Id. (applying this 
standard to the correctness of a vehicle stop under the 
community caretaker doctrine)(citations omitted). 
2. Should this Court reverse a trial court ruling, 
dispositive of the issue on appeal, which defendant has not 
challenged on appeal? This Court will accept the findings 
of the trial court unchallenged by the defendant on appeal. 
State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah App. 
1995)(refusing to consider the trial court's finding that a 
consent to search was voluntary, unchallenged on appeal). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1) (1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182 (1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Christian H. Mayfield, was charged with two 
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substances and 
one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 
1-2). Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in a 
warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion 
(R. 21, 27-29). Defendant petitioned for interlocutory 
appeal, and this Court granted the petition (R. 32). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 19, 1995, at about 2:15 p.m., Trooper Scott 
Singleton of the Utah Highway Patrol was alone on patrol, 
driving south on 1-15 near the port of entry in Box Elder 
County (R. 43-44, 47). In front of him in the lefthand lane 
he saw defendant's car and watched defendant, the driver of 
the car, attempt to fasten his seat belt. As defendant 
reached for the seat belt the car weaved across the fog line 
and then corrected back onto the highway (R. 44). Trooper 
Singleton followed defendant for about one-half mile without 
incident, at which point the trooper pulled the car over, 
intending to warn the driver that in future he should either 
pull over or secure his seat belt before operating his car 
(R. 44, 66) . 
Trooper Singleton approached the car and asked 
defendant for his license and registration (R. 44-45). 
Defendant said that he did not have a valid license, and he 
did not produce a registration (R. 45) -1 He also told the 
trooper that he had a warrant out on him2 and that he was to 
report to the Davis County Jail before 5:00 p.m. (R. 45, 
1
 Only later, after the search, did Trooper Singleton find 
the registration in the trunk of the car, and, apparently only 
then, did Trooper Singleton run a check which revealed that the car 
had not been stolen (R. 54-55, 72). 
2
 Trooper Singleton acknowledged that he was unable to find 
an outstanding warrant on defendant, though the context of the 
comment seems to indicate that he did not do a warrants check until 
after the ensuing search of the car: "He said there was a warrant, 
but I never found one. I went over to the passenger side and asked 
him to step out . . . ." (R. 45). 
3 
77). Trooper Singleton then asked defendant to step out of 
the car and then frisked him (R. 45, 56) .3 Thereafter, the 
trooper asked defendant if the passenger, Jeffrey Cummings, 
had a valid license. When defendant answered affirmatively, 
Trooper Singleton asked defendant to return to the driver's 
seat, and then stepped to the other side of the car to 
approach the passenger (R. 45). Believing that he would be 
requesting that Cummings drive the car away, Trooper 
Singleton asked Cummings to exit the car, frisked him for 
safety reasons and asked him for identification (R. 45, 67-
70, 75-76, 79). 
As Cummings handed over his driver's license, Trooper 
Singleton noticed that Cummings' hands trembled so unusually 
badly and that he appeared so extraordinarily nervous, that 
he (Singleton) became nervous himself and became suspicious 
about the presence of weapons or contraband (R. 45-46, 56-
57, 60-61). In order to alleviate hsi concerns, the trooper 
asked Cummings if there were any weapons or contraband in 
the car. Cummings answered that there were none (R. 46). 
The trooper then returned to defendant, informing him 
that Cummings' behavior was making him "uneasy," and 
"nervous," and so asked defendant if there were any weapons 
or contraband in the car (R. 46). When defendant said there 
3
 Trooper Singleton's Warrantless Arrest Probable Cause 
Statement ("report"), to which Singleton referred on cross-
examination, indicates that the pat down did not uncover any 
weapons (R. 3), but that fact was not put before the trial court. 
4 
were none in the car, Trooper Singleton asked if he could 
look for weapons or contraband (R. 47, 58). Defendant's 
immediate response was to explain away Cummings' 
nervousness, stating that his companion always got nervous 
(R. 58-59). The trooper restated his concern about 
Cummings' abnormal behavior and again asked if he could look 
in the car for weapons or contraband (R. 59). Apparently 
receiving no answer,4 the trooper asked defendant if there 
was a weapon in the car, and defendant answered there was 
not (R. 59). When asked if he minded the trooper's looking 
in the car, defendant answered, *I don't care" (R. 59-60). 
Trooper Singleton then had defendant stand in front of 
the car while he searched it (R. 47) .5 Between the front 
seats he found a metal pipe, which, in the officer's 
experience, was used for smoking marijuana and a plastic 
prescription bottle containing marijuana (R. 47-48, 50). On 
the floor on the passenger's side he found a fanny pack 
containing a large knife and a package of cigarettes (R. 48-
49). Within the cellophane of the cigarette package there 
was a small baggie containing a whitish substance which 
4
 When led by defense counsel to say that defendant had not 
answered after having again been asked if the trooper could look 
for weapons or contraband, Trooper Singleton answered, "I believe 
that's correct, if that's in the report" (R. 59). The report, 
however, makes no mention that defendant did not respond to the 
trooper's question (R. 3). 
5
 Trooper Singleton acknowledged that at this point, after 
speaking with defendant about Cummings' nervousness and having 
defendant also stand at the front of the car, that neither 
defendant nor Cummings were free to leave (R. 57-58) . 
5 
appeared to be methamphetamine (R. 49). Cummings said the 
fanny pack was his, and Trooper Singleton arrested him for 
possession of a controlled substance. As the trooper 
handcuffed Cummings, defendant approached the trooper and 
said that the fanny pack was his, whereupon Trooper 
Singleton arrested him also. After taking both men into 
custody, the trooper continued his search, finding inside a 
day planner, which Cummings had left on the roof of the car, 
another small bag containing a crushed whitish substance 
which also appeared to be methamphetamine (R. 49, 51, 73). 
The trooper also found another baggie containing what 
appeared to be marijuana between the passenger seat cushions 
(R. 49-50). All items tested positive for marijuana and 
methamphetamine (R. 50). At the jail, Trooper Singleton also 
issued defendant a warning for an improper lane change (R. 
60) . 
SUMMARY OF ACUMEN! 
POINT I 
The trooper's stop of the car defendant was driving was 
justified because the trooper observed defendant committing 
traffic violations by swerving off the road while unlawfully 
attempting to fasten his seat belt. The stop was also 
justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the 
trooper stopped the car to warn defendant of the danger of 
operating a vehicle while fastening a seat belt. 
6 
POINT II 
The trial court ruled that the search of the car was 
valid as an inventory search after finding on a legitimate 
ground for impounding the car. On appeal defendant does not 
discuss or challenge this conclusion. Therefore, the Court 
should summarily affirm the trial court's conclusion. 
AEGPMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
INITIAL STOP OF DEPENDANT'S CAR WAS JUSTIFIED 
EITHER BY DEFENDANT'S TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS OR BY THE 
OFFICER'S REASONABLE ACTION UNDER THE COMMUNITY 
CARETAKER DOCTRINE 
Relying on State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), defendant 
challenges the trial court's finding that the initial stop 
was justified. Defendant argues that he did not commit a 
traffic violation under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1) (1993) in 
the officer's presence, and the initial stop of the car was 
not justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. Aplt's Br. at 8-
11. BallQ, however, is factually distinguishable from this 
case. Moreover, the focus of the prosecutor's argument and 
Trooper Singleton's testimony plainly suggest that the trial 
court found the initial stop justified not only by a traffic 
violation, but also by the community caretaker doctrine, a 
basis for the trial court's decision which defendant does 
not even address on appeal. 
7 
A. The Initial Stop was Justified by the 
Trooper's Observation of Two Traffic Violations. 
"In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the 
State must establish that the stop in question was . . . 
incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence . . . ." fifillQ, 871 P.2d at 586; see alSQ State v. 
Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(same). 
In Bello. a driver was stopped because the car he was 
driving momentarily weaved out of its lane. Bello, 871 P.2d 
at 585. This Court held the traffic stop invalid because 
section 41-6-61 (l)6 requires a driver to operate his vehicle 
within a single lane "as nearly as practical." Id. at 587. 
However, the driver in Bella was driving a truck with a 
camper shell in extremely windy conditions, a circumstance 
beyond the driver's complete control, which this Court found 
very significant. Id. Further bolstering the Court's view 
was the officer's failure to observe any other deviations 
from a normal driving pattern while following the truck for 
more than two miles after first observing the truck drift 
across the lane markers. Id. Based on these facts, the 
Court found that uthe single instance of weaving . . . could 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1)(1993), provides: 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked 
lanes for traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical 
entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from 
the lane until the operator has determined the movement 
can be made safely. 
8 
not constitute a violation of section 41-6-61(1) and 
therefore cannot serve as the constitutional basis for 
stopping Bello's truck.'' Id. 
In this case defendant also only momentarily drifted 
out of his lane (R. 44, 66). However, unlike the defendant 
in Bello. defendant in this case was not at the mercy of the 
elements, but rather violated section 41-6-61(1) as a result 
of violating another statute, i.e., the seat belt 
requirement.7 In other words, the defendant in Bello could 
not "practically" have avoided a technical violation of the 
statute given road conditions that were entirely beyond his 
control. Defendant in this case, however, was not subjected 
to forces beyond his control. Rather, by reaching for his 
seat belt while operating the car, he created the conditions 
that led to his lack of control, conditions which themselves 
evidenced a violation of another statute. Additionally, 
unlike the officer in Bello. the trooper in this case 
witnessed how one violation generated the other. In sum, 
defendant plainly, volitionally, violated section 41-6-
61(1). £££ Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (wxWhen an officer 
observes a traffic offense--however minor--he has probable 
cause to stop the driver of the vehicle'")(quoting United 
States v. Cummins. 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182(2) (1993), provides, in part that 
"the driver and front seat passengers of a motor vehicle operated 
on a highway shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety 
belt system . . . ." 
9 
denied. 502 U.S. 962 (1991)). Based on his observation, 
Trooper Singleton properly stopped and cited defendant for 
the violation (R. 60), which the trial court correctly 
recognized as a justifiable basis for the stop (See 
Memorandum Decision, R. 27-29, attached at Addendum B). 
B. The Initial Stop was Justified Under 
the cpinpwEiity Caretaker ppctrine-
The propriety of a automobile stop under the community 
caretaker doctrine is ultimately a question of 
"reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360, 
363-64 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). 
In Provo City, two men approached a police officer and 
informed him that a man had just asked them where he could 
buy some cocaine so he could Mrive himself into a wall." 
Id. at 361. From the car's description and the licence 
plate number given to him, the officer located the car, 
followed it briefly without observing any traffic violations 
and then stopped it only out of concern for the driver's 
welfare. Smelling alcohol on the defendant's breath, the 
officer administered field sobriety tests, which the 
defendant failed, and arrested the defendant for driving 
under the influence. Id. 
Recognizing that *'[i]t would be too extravagant to 
contend that a benign purpose of rendering assistance could 
never justify the stop of a motorist," Provo City, 844 P.2d 
at 363 (quoting United States v. Dunbar. 470 F. Supp. 704, 
10 
707 (D. Conn.), aff'd. 610 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1979)), this 
Court upheld the stop, notwithstanding the absence of any-
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, under the 
community caretaker doctrine. Id. at 365. In so ruling, 
the Court adopted the following test to determine the 
justifiability of a welfare stop: 
The trial court must evaluate the legitimacy of an 
alleged community caretaker stop as follows: 
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth 
Amendment definition of that term? Second, based 
upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in 
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker 
function—under the given circumstances, would a 
reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a 
purpose consistent with community caretaker 
functions? Third, based upon an objective 
analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an 
imminent danger to life or limb? 
Id. at 364 (citing Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1046) . 
Applying this test, the trial court correctly 
determined that defendant's stop was justified.8 First, 
8
 The trial court's finding that the initial stop was 
justified is not by its terms founded more deliberately on the 
community caretaker doctrine than it is on the traditional basis 
for a stop, i.e., traffic violation or suspicion of criminal 
activity, but the circumstances of the case and the focus of the 
argument plainly suggest that the decision was also based on the 
community caretaker doctrine. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1130 (M[w]hen 
a trial court has failed to make findings of fact on the record, we 
will "assume that the [trial court found facts] in accord with its 
decision' whenever it would be %reasonable to assume that the court 
actually made such findings'")(quoting State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)). 
At the suppression hearing Trooper Singleton testified that he 
stopped defendant after he observed the car defendant was driving 
weave over the fog line and then correct itself as defendant 
attached his seat belt (R. 44). However, the trooper acknowledged 
that his purpose in stopping defendant was to warn him about the 
need to attach his seat belt before operating the car (R. 66) . The 
principal thrust of the prosecutor's argument was that the stop was 
11 
Trooper Singleton acknowledged that defendant and Cummings 
were not free to leave when he detained them out of concern 
for the presence of weapons or contraband (R. 57-58). 
Second, any reasonable police officer, having witnessed the 
car weave off the roadway due to defendant's loss of control 
while buckling his seat belt, would have stopped defendant 
to warn him of the danger of his actions. Moreover, the 
record is undisputed that Trooper Singleton did not stop 
defendant for any criminal investigatory purpose. Police 
officers are hired precisely for the purpose of protecting 
citizens, entirely apart from any criminality, by warning 
them that their actions might be dangerous to themselves and 
others. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 ("Police officers are 
under a duty to enforce the traffic laws."). Third, 
defendant's momentary loss of vehicle control demonstrated 
an obvious, imminent safety hazard, both to himself and to 
anybody he might have hit as a result of weaving. It is 
plain that *imminent danger" does not contemplate a 
justified for safety purposes under the community caretaker 
doctrine (R. 97-98). The trial court specifically found that 
*[t]he vehicle was stopped and the driver advised of the danger of 
attaching a seat belt during the operation of a vehicle" (R. 27). 
Given the prosecutor's reliance on the community caretaker 
doctrine, the trooper's testimony, and the trial court's finding, 
it must be assumed that the trial court's ruling was also based on 
the community caretaker doctrine. Even if it was not, this Court 
should consider that theory as an alternative argument to affirm 
the trial court's ruling. See State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 
n.4 (Utah App. 1991)(stating the reviewing court may affirm the 
trial courtfs ruling on any proper ground). The Court should note 
that defendant has entirely failed to address this ground of the 
trial court's ruling, and therefore should accept its conclusion 
that the initial stop was justified. See Aple's Br. at 12-13. 
12 
necessary outcome in the immediate future, since the test 
was satisfied in Provo City by an encounter in which an 
alleged suicide-in-the-making had not yet materialized when 
the officer finally discovered the driver after the passage 
of some time following the officer's first learning of the 
matter. Provo City. 844 P.2d at 361, 365. In this case it 
was reasonable to assume that a driver who was once observed 
fastening his seat belt while driving would likely do so 
again the next time he drove, possibly with more unfortunate 
results. In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that 
Trooper Singleton's stopping defendant was justified under 
the community caretaker doctrine. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE TRIAL 
COURT#S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIABLY 
DETAINED FOR LACK OF LICENSE AND REGISTRATION OR 
ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE LACK OF REGISTRATION 
PROVIDED A LEGAL BASIS FOR IMPOUNDING AND, 
THEREFORE, SEARCHING THE CAR, THIS COURT SHOULD 
ACCEPT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In support of his suppression motion, defendant argued 
that his continued detention following the initial stop was 
unjustified because a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity could not be based on Cummings' show of 
nervousness. In support of this position, defendant relied 
BellQf State vt Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1995), 
State Vt RQkinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) and State 
v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) (R. 80). 
Relying on Zieglemari/ the trial court agreed with defendant 
13 
that Trooper Singleton could not infer from Cummings' 
nervousness that defendant had committed or was about to 
commit a crime, and, therefore, the trooper's questions 
about whether there were weapons or contraband in the car 
were improper (Memorandum Decision, R. 28-29). However, the 
court found that defendant's detention was justified by the 
trooper's immediate discovery that defendant lacked both a 
driver's license and registration,9 which under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1993), justified impounding and searching 
the car (R. 27-29).10 That finding was the sole basis for 
the court's decision that the search was valid. On appeal, 
defendant totally fails to address this ground of the trial 
court's ruling. 
It is well established that this Court will not reject 
a trial court's ruling that a defendant has failed to 
9
 £££ State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 (Utah 
1995)(upholding reasonableness of arrest for driving with suspended 
license); State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 
1992)("After stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer 
may '"briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he 
examines the vehicle registration and the driverfs license."'") 
(citations omitted); cf. Provo City. 844 P.2d at 361 (officer's 
request for driver's license and registration unchallenged during 
community caretaker stop). 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1) (a) (1993) provided that uany 
peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take possession of 
any vehicle . . . that is being operated with improper 
registration." £££ State v, Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah 
App. 1992)("Inventory searches of impounded vehicle's contents 
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement . . . . " ) . 
Section 41-la-1101 (l)(a) was amended and renumbered in 1996, and 
now appears at subsection (1)(f)(i-iii), a more precise statement 
of when defective registrations give rise to impoundment (see 
Addendum A). 
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address on appeal. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d at 885 (refusing to 
consider the trial court's finding that a consent to search 
was voluntary when it was unchallenged on appeal); State v. 
Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 n.4 (Utah App. 1990)(having "no 
occasion to consider" the court's finding a roadblock legal 
unchallenged by the defendant on appeal). Because defendant 
has not challenged the basis of the trial court's finding 
that the search was justified, this Court should accept that 
finding and, consequently, uphold the validity of the 
search.11 
CONCISION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^ day of August, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
11
 Similarly failing to regard the basis of the trial court's 
suppression order, defendant argues at length that "the evidence 
should have been suppressed because defendant's consent to search 
was not voluntary and was obtained by exploitation of the prior 
illegality." Aplt's Br. at Point III. However, the trial court 
concluded that "[t]he trooper's improper question regarding weapons 
or narcotics occurred after he already had legal authority to 
search the vehicle. The validity of the consent is therefore not 
at issue" (R. 29) (emphasis added). Thus, defendant attacks on 
appeal a basis for suppression which the trial court did not even 
rely on. Since the State does not dispute the trial court's 
conclusion, no argument regarding consent is necessary. 
15 
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, 
postage prepaid, to Michael D. Bouwhuis, attorney for 
defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd., Suite #102, Ogden, Utah 
84401, this I,/ day of August, 1996. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-61 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic the following provisions 
apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as 
practical entirely within a single lane and may 
not be moved from the lane until the operator has 
determined the movement can be made safely. 
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes and 
providing for two-way movement of traffic, a 
vehicle may not be operated in the center lane 
except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle 
traveling in the same direction, and when the 
center lane is clear of traffic within a safe 
distance; or 
(b) in preparation of making or completing a left 
turn or where the center lane is allocated 
exclusively to traffic moving in the same 
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the 
allocation is designated by official 
traffic-control devices. 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be 
erected directing specified traffic to use a 
designated lane or designating those lanes to be 
used by traffic moving in a particular direction 
regardless of the center of the roadway. Operators 
of vehicles shall obey the directions of these 
devices. 
Section 41-6-182 
(1) In this section "motor vehicle" has the same 
meaning as provided in Section 41-6-148.20. 
(2) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 for 
a child using a child restraint device, the driver 
and front seat passengers of a motor vehicle 
operated on a highway shall wear a properly 
adjusted and fastened safety belt system that 
meets standards set by the commissioner of the 
Department of Public Safety. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 for 
a child using a child restraint device, the driver 
of a motor vehicle shall secure, or cause to be 
secured, a properly adjusted and fastened safety 
seat belt system on any passenger in the front 
seat who is younger than 18 years of age. 
Section 41-la-1101 
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a 
warrant, may seize and take possession of any 
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
(a) that the division or the peace officer has 
reason to believe has been stolen; 
(b) on which any identification number has been 
defaced, altered, or obliterated; 
(c) that has been abandoned on the public 
highways; 
(d) for which the applicant has written a check 
for registration or title fees that has not been 
honored by the applicant's bank and that is not 
paid within 30 days; 
(e) that is placed on the water with improper 
registration; or 
(f) that is being operated on a highway: 
(i) with registration that has been 
expired for more than three months; 
(ii) having never been properly 
registered by the current owner; or 
(iii) with registration that is suspended 
or revoked. 
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a 
seized vessel, the vessel's trailer may be seized 
to transport and store the vessel. 
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking 
possession of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor 
under this section shall immediately notify the 
division of the action. 
(4) A vehicle or vessel seized under this section 
shall be moved by a peace officer or by a tow 
truck that meets the standards established: 
(a) by the Department of Public Safety under 
Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b); and 
(b) under Title 27, Chapter 17, Motor Carrier 
Safety Act. 
(5) (a) The commission shall make rules in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, setting standards 
for impound yards that may be used by peace 
officers and the division. 
(b) The impound yard standards shall be equitable, 
reasonable, and unrestrictive as to the number of 
impound yards per geographical area. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN TEE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
JEFFREY L. CUMMINGS, 
CHRISTIAN H. MAYFIELD 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 951 - 119 FS 
951 - 120 FS 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFJJELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motions to Suppress. 
The Court heard evidence on December 6, 1995; and also viewed a video tape submitted into 
evidence. The evidence indicates that on October 19, 1995, shortly after 2:00 pm, the 
Highway Patrol Trooper was southbound on Interstate 15, near the Port of Entry. He 
observed the Defendant's vehicle on the inside lane of traffic and observed that as the driver 
attempted to put on his seat belt, the vehicle swerved or weaved over the fog line and then 
back into the proper lane of traffic. The vehicle was stopped and the driver advised of the 
danger of attaching a seat belt during the operation of a vehicle. The driver waralso 
requested to produce a drivers license. The driver was unable to produce a license, and, in 
fact, admitted that he had no valid license. He additionally advised the officer that he was 
MICtOfflMffD 
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required to report to jail later that same day on an unrelated offense. The Court finds that 
the initial stop by the officer was justified, and that the continued detention was justified once 
the officer learned the driver was operating the vehicle illegally. 
In the recent case of State vs. Ziegleman. 276 Utah Advance Reports 56, 
(October 26, 1995)
 f the Court cited a line of cases for the proposition that, under 
circumstances quite similar to these, the Trooper's question whether any weapons or 
narcotics were in the vehicle, was a violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights. 
The facts in Ziegleman are remarkably similar to the present case. Defendant Ziegleman 
was pulled over because the Trooper intended to issue a warning for speeding. Ziegleman 
produced his driver's license but could not produce his registration. He appeared extremely 
nervous. The Trooper asked if there were "any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle". 
Defendant indicated he did not believe so. The Trooper then asked for permission to search 
and the Defendant replied, "Help yourself". When the passenger exited the vehicle, he 
"exhibited extreme nervousness". After a thorough search of the vehicle, a kilo of cocaine 
was discovered under the hood of the car. The Court of Appeals in Ziegleman held that the 
Trooper's question concerning weapons and narcotics violated the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights, thereby negating the validity of the consent to search. 
While the facts in the present case are very similar to the facts in Ziegleman, the 
Court finds the following facts to be significant and distinguishing from Ziegleman: 
1. The driver, Mayfield, did not have a valid driver's license, nor was he able to 
produce any evidence, of registratioiL. 
2. The items seized were located in the passenger portion of the vehicle primarily 
on or between the front seats. 
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These facts are significant because they establish that the officer had a legal basis for 
impounding the vehicle, (lack of driver's license or registration). The fact that he testified 
he may have been willing to allow the passenger to drive the vehicle away does not negate 
his legal authority to impound the vehicle and thereafter conduct an inventory search. 
(41 - la-1101) The Court also finds it significant that the items seized were in the front 
passenger and driver area of the vehicle, the same area where one might logically expect to 
locate registration papers. This type of search was much less invasive than the search in 
Ziegleman where contraband was ultimately located next to the battery under the hood of the 
vehicle. 
The Trooper's improper question regarding weapons or narcotics occurred after he 
already had legal authority to search the vehicle. The validity of the consent is therefore not 
at issue. Both the stop and search conducted by the officer were legal and satisfy the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Defendant's Motions To Suppress are denied. 
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